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Abstract 
An adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact the emotions have 
intentionality as well as phenomenality. In seeking to provide such an account, under an 
enactivist banner, it is suggested that a good place to start is by adjusting Prinz‟s (2004) 
Embodied Appraisal Theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order 
to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although this is 
essentially along the right lines, the basic proposal needs some tweaking. This is because 
as naturalized account of content, teleosemantics fails. Still the guiding thought behind 
EAT can be rescued if we switch to a content-free teleosemiotics. This combined with 
other assumptions yields as truly radical enactivist account of emotion. After explaining 
the rationale for making the critical adjustment EAT, the modified variant is defended 
against critics, showing that it offers an adequate framework for thinking about the 
intentionality and phenomenality of basic human emotions. 
 






Cognitivist approaches to the mind stress that engaging intelligently with aspects of the 
world, always and everywhere, depends on the manipulation of contentful representations 
in some way or other. The cogntivist credo is: no intelligent activity without 
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representation. Assuming this to be true of cognition in general, if follows that it is true of 
anything that counts as social cognition – even the most basic kinds of the latter.  
 In a bid to resist this trend of thought, I promote a radically enactivist approach to 
basic mentality, defending the view that not every kind of mentality – and certainly not 
all of the most important or interesting kinds – reduces to or otherwise involves or 
implicates contentful or representational activity (Hutto 2006, Hutto and Myin 
forthcoming). In particular, I defend the view that our most elementary ways of engaging 
with others is phenomenally charged and has intentionally directedness, despite being 
non-representational. But humans, at least, have – in addition – more sophisticated and 
articulate means of making sense of others and themselves, as well. My conjecture is that 
the normal means through which we acquire this high level competence is by 
participating in narrative practices of a special sort, when appropriately supported by 
others (Hutto 2008).  
 I regard these as distinct proposals that, if true (or close to truth) are equally 
important, complementary parts of the full story of what intersubjective relating and 
understanding involves. Thus I am surprised to discover that Krueger (2010) believes that 
“by stressing the importance of narrativity and narrative practice in his particular brand of 
radical enactivism, Hutto perhaps passes too quickly over more fundamental affective 
structures that scaffold basic forms of social understanding” (p. 68).i This complaint is 
not harsh and it is swiftly followed by a friendly invitation: “I am not asking Hutto to 
change his story. Quite the contrary. It‟s a good story, a challenging story. I‟m merely 
suggesting that Hutto tell his same story once again, but with feeling” (Krueger 2010, p. 
68, emphasis original). Krueger‟s request that I need to augment my account of basic 
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emotional engagements has echoes of an earlier appraisal that Hobson (2006) gave it. 
Hobson writes: “I am more or less happy with Hutto‟s line of thinking about feeling 
being a way of experiencing, if by this he means a quality of experiencing rather than a 
particular form of experiencing. I add this qualification because I think feelings are part 
and parcel of what makes experiences, any experiences, what they are” (p. 180, emphasis 
added). 
 The general verdict appears to be that, even though I profess a „primacy of affect‟ 
view  (one that openly regards emotional engagements as phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically prior to – and thus distinct from – sophisticated, contentful forms of 
cognition) there is a suspicion or worry that my version of radical enactivism just isn‟t 
touchy-feely enough. In what follows, borrowing and modifying some ideas from Jesse 
Prinz, I hope to set the record straight (or at least straighter) about place of feelings in my 
understanding of emotion. 
 
2. Feelings First: Resisting the False Choice 
 
Many philosophers understand feelings and emotions either exhaustively as, or 
necessarily involving, contentful cognitions of some kind. Some hold that emotions are 
evaluative judgements; that they present the world as being a certain way (Solomon 
1976). Other that emotions are judgements that involve assenting to „value-laden‟ 
appearances (Nussbaum 2001). Others still, think of emotions are construals that require 
imagining something as if it had certain properties (Armon-Jones 1989). 
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 Although there is no uniform understanding of meaning of „cognitive‟ or its extension 
in this literature, as Ratcliffe (2008) astutely observes in “describing emotions as 
cognitive, philosophers tend to mean at least that they are intentional states of some kind. 
They either are or at least [essentially] involve evaluations, appraisals or judgements” (p. 
20) 
 Cognitive theories are attractive because they satisfy “a deep intuition that emotions 
are meaningful. They … inform us about our relationship to the world, they embody our 
convictions, and they factor intelligibly into our decisions in life” (Prinz 2004, p. 16). If 
emotions just are, or essentially involve, contentful cognitions of some kind then 
apparently they (or their essential components) have the right world-relating intentional 
properties and the right forms for entering into potential dialogue with our reasoning 
processes. The recognized downside of cognitive theories is that if this is the whole story 
about emotion then it is easy to imagine the relevant cognitions (e.g. judgements, 
appraisals) taking place in disembodied, entirely „cold‟, „detached‟ – and, seemingly, 
„unemotional‟ ways. 
 Consider Wells‟ heady Martians. They have: 
 
all the complex apparatus of digestion, which makes up the bulk of our bodies, did not 
exist in the Martians. They were heads – merely heads. Entrails they had none… Men 
go happy or miserable as they have healthy or unhealthy livers, or sound gastric 
glands. But the Martians were lifted above all these organic fluctuations of mood and 
emotion ... Without the body the brain would, of course, become a mere selfish 
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intelligence, without any of the emotional substratum of the human being … (Wells 
1898/2005, p. 125-7). 
 
 Persuaded by imaginings of this kind, some are persuaded of the truth of some or 
other version of Somatic Feeling Theory (SFT), according to which emotions just are 
feelings of bodily changes as they occur.
ii
  This essential Jamesian idea has been 
revamped in the Somatic Perception Theory (SPT) of the sort advocated by Damasio 
(1994). The SPT revises the account to allow for emotions to occur even without the 
relevant bodily changes, just in case the relevant brain activity that monitors the bodily 
changes is present. Hence, „as if‟ feelings triggered by central processes in the brain 
suffice for having certain emotional experiences. It is thought to be an advantage of this 
theory that it accommodates the fact that subjects claim to experience certain feelings 
even in the absence of any link to the normal bodily basis for having such feelings – e.g. 
as is allegedly the case with certain kinds of spinal cord injury. 
 However, it is a matter of dispute to what extent feelings and emotions can truly exist 
without any link to normal bodily changes. Questions have been raised about both the 
vivacity of such reported feelings and whether they should be counted as genuine at all. 
Also, it has been stressed, that even in the worst cases there is always some degree of 
bodily feedback that reaches the brain – i.e. thorough information channels that remain 
open to the brain via the bloodstream or the vagus nerve (see Colombetti and Thompson 
2008 for discussion). 
 Whatever the final outcome of that debate, a more serious charge is that both SFT and 
SPT “have little to say about the processes by which external stimuli are evaluated for 
 Truly Enactive Emotion 7 
C:\Documents and Settings\lisqgh\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\S5F5NTZF\dh Truly Enactive Emotion 
ER 1 March 2011.doc 8/13/2012 7 
ecological and social significance” (Hill 2009, p.199). Basically and generally, in 
reducing emotions to mere feelings, “somatic theories have trouble explaining what it is 
for an emotion to have an intentional object or target” (Hill 2009, p.200). They lack 
reach. 
 Putting all of this together, we should resist the false choice between pure cognitive 
theories and pure feeling theories. Apparently, what is really needed is an account of 
“how emotions can be sophisticated cognitive states and, at the same time, have bodily 
feelings as a major component” (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 17, emphasis added). Prima facie, this 
looks difficult to achieve. Ratcliffe‟s diagnosis is that we will only do so by overhauling 
some deeply entrenched constraining assumptions: “Central to this overhaul is the 
abandonment of the distinction between cognition and affect” (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 17). I 
concur – and this, if anything, is a job for a philosopher.  
 
3. Embodied Appraisal Theory: Putting Humpty Together Again? 
 
Enter Prinz‟s Embodied Appraisal Theory (EAT)! Prima facie EAT has the potential to 
bring the cognitive and feeling aspects of emotions together again in a unified account. It 
rejects the conceptualization hypothesis, assuming that judgements and appraisals do not 
require the possession of concepts. It also rejects the disembodiment hypothesis, 
assuming that emotions cannot occur without at least some somatic component. But it 
accepts the appraisal hypothesis, assuming that emotions involve representations of the 
organism-environment relation. With regard to the latter, EAT follows Arnold (1960) in 
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stressing that “to appraise something is to see it as affecting oneself in some way that 
matters” (p. 171). 
 My game plan is to show how EAT (or something near enough) can be made to work 
if we make an important technical tweak – a tweak that allow us to address what would 
otherwise be important objections to foundations of the theory. 
 EAT is meant to be an embodied theory of emotion, as opposed to a cogntivist theory.  
It regards emotions as non-cognitive, embodied appraisals. But this is only because it 
recognizes that emotional engagements involve brain regions other than those in 
prefrontal areas. For Prinz, this is sufficient for emotions to count as embodied as 
opposed to cognitive because he holds that “a state is cognitive just in case it includes 
representations under the control of structures in executive systems, which, in mammals, 
are found in the prefrontal cortex” (2004 p. 47). Thus Prinz‟s non-cognitivism is 
motivated solely by the fact that, without engaging the neo-cortex at all, “the amygdala 
can orchestrate the full suite of bodily and behavioural responses that are associated with 
fear” (Prinz 2004, p. 34). His assumption, of course, is that fear is not special and that the 
same holds true for other emotions. 
 Thus, despite being non-cognitive in this peculiar sense, EAT understands emotions to 
be essentially representational in nature. Prinz‟s reasoning is as follows “Appraisal 
theories claim that emotions necessarily comprise representations of organism-
environment relations with respect to well-being” (Prinz 2004, p. 52, emphasis added). 
For this reason, he believes that “to show that emotions are appraisals, one must first 
establish that they are mental representations” (Prinz 2004, p. 52).  
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 In attempting to establish this, Prinz adopts what is now probably the most popular 
theory of mental representation – teleosemantics. Accordingly, he holds that “a mental 
representation is a mental state that is reliably caused by something and has been set in 
place by learning or evolution to detect that thing … a mental representation is a mental 
state that has been set up to be set off by something” (Prinz 2004, p. 54). 
 On this basis, EAT holds that the relevant representations “can be inextricably bound 
up with states that are involved in the detection of bodily changes” (Prinz 2004, p. 52). 
Yet, EAT differs from pure somatic theories such as SFT and SPT, because it also claims 
that the relevant registrations and detections of bodily changes must be in the service of 
representing external, objective properties (and not, e.g., response-dependent, secondary 
qualities).  
 Plausibly, Prinz insists that emotions must “detect something more than the 
vicissitudes of vasculature. Otherwise, they would confer no survival advantage” (2004, 
p. 60). It is by having intentional directedness that aims at things external to the organism 
that emotions can play their distinctive roles in guiding our activity. Thus “Emotions 
promote behavioural responses. We [are meant to] run when we are afraid [of something 
external]. If emotions represented bodily changes this would be unintelligible. We should 
flee when our hearts race” (Prinz 2004, p. 59).  
 Nevertheless, Prinz holds that emotions do not have ordinary intentional objects, such 
as particular objects or people, as their proper targets – accept incidentally. This does not 
mean that emotions lack intentionality. Rather, as Prinz stresses, emotions are intentional 
“in their own right” (2004, p. 62). According to EAT, emotions are meant to represent 
core relational themes, such as loss.  
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 In line with this, Prinz defines the object of an emotion, generally, as the 
environmental conditions (actual or imagined) that elicit it. Importantly, he goes on to 
distinguish a formal object of an emotion (which is the property in virtue of which an 
event is meant to elicit an emotion) and a particular object of emotion, which is the 
eliciting event itself (Prinz 2004, p. 62). With these distinctions in place he acknowledges 
an important ambiguity in our talk of „aboutness‟, remarking that: 
 
Saying that my sadness is about the death [of a loved one] does not mean that my 
sadness represents the death; rather it means that the death is what has caused me to 
become sad. I can continue to think about the death after my sadness subsides, and I 
can continue to be sad after my thoughts of the death subside (Prinz 2004, p. 62). 
 
 In accord with teleosemantics the idea the emotions represent core relational themes 
translates into the idea that we are „set up to be set off‟ by events having such thematic 
properties since they will have mattered to our ancestors.
iii
 Assuming things have not 
changed dramatically for us, not only do such themes continue to have significance for 
our well being, it follows that, when conditions are right, we can be made aware of events 
relating to such themes by registering changes in our bodies (Prinz 2004, p. 68, see also 
p. 66-67). And so, we come to EAT‟s big reconciling idea: “Each emotion is both an 
internal body monitor and a detector of dangers, threats, losses, or other matters of 
concern. Emotions are gut reactions; they use our bodies to tell us how we are faring in 
the world” (Prinz 2004, p. 69, emphases added).iv 
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 There is nothing ad hoc about this proposal from the perspective of teleosemantics. 
According to biologically based version of that sort of theory of mental representational 
capacities, “mental representations often work this way. They track real contents via 
more superficial nominal contents” (Prinz 2004, p. 68). In her frugality Mother Nature 
supplies us with less than perfect appearance-tracking detectors, not essence tracking 
detectors. These are good enough to enable us to get by (at least compared to the means 
used by our ancestral competitors). 
 A nice feature of EAT‟s account of the origins of basic emotional experiences as a 
way of responding to core relational themes is that it enables us to make sense of 
misaligned emotional experiences. Hence, “Sometimes we are sad when there has not 
been any loss. This might occur under the influence of certain drugs (e.g. alcohol), while 
listening to music, or even while making a sad facial expression. Some cases of clinical 
depression may involve chronic sadness without any loss” (Prinz 2004, p. 64). 
 
3. Radical Enactivism: Tweaking EAT 
 
EAT has promise, but it is problematic as it stands. EAT can be improved if we abandon 
its semantic gloss. This can be easily done if we recast EAT as an account of the 
emotions based on teleosemiotics, not teleosemantics. Why make this change?  
 To qualify as representational in a properly semantic and contentful a mental state 
must play the right kind of role in a larger cognitive economy. It must – so to speak, 
function to say that things stand thus and so. This requires it to meet Ramsey‟s (2007) 
„job description‟ challenge. But teleosemantic theories only posit states (or ensembles of 
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states) of organisms that (1) are reliably caused by (or nomically depend upon) the 
occurrence of certain external features, and/or that (2) are disposed to produce certain 
effects (under specific conditions), and that (3) were selected because they do (1) and (2).  
 Yet states that only possess properties 1-3 fail to meet the job description challenge. 
As Fodor (2008) puts it, they might exhibit some kind of intentional directedness (with a 
„t‟) but they do not exhibit intensionality (with an „s‟). Truly representational mental 
states must have the proper function of saying „things stand thus and so‟ as opposed to 
merely having the proper function of guiding a systems responses with respect to specific 
kinds of worldly offerings.  
 Despite initial optimism, many now doubt that attempts to naturalize semantic content 
by appeal to biologically based accounts have any chance of success. Godfrey-Smith 
(2006) provides an astute assessment “there is a growing suspicion that we have been 
looking for the wrong kind of theory, in some big sense. Naturalistic treatments of 
semantic properties have somehow lost proper contact with the phenomena” (p. 42). 
Nevertheless, he also acknowledges that the driving idea behind teleosemantics – that 
evolved structures can have a kind of „specificity‟ or „directedness‟ – is essentially 
correct: “there is an important kind of natural involvement relation that is picked out by 
selection-based concepts of function. But this relation is found in many cases that do not 
involve representation or anything close to it” (p. 60). The upshot is that something more 
would need to be added to the standard teleosemantic theories if the states they posit are 
to qualify as representational states – i.e. if they are to meet the minimal requirement that 
Ramsey specifies for talk of mental state contents (for more details see Hutto 2008, ch. 3, 
Hutto and Myin forthcoming).  
 Truly Enactive Emotion
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 In short, it is not clear that it is possible to supplement teleosemantic accounts in the 
required way without going beyond purely biological resources. Thankfully, it is also 
unnecessary. Nothing important is lost if in the place of teleosemantics we put 
teleosemiotics. Teleosemiotics is teleosemantics – without the semantic gloss. 
Teleosemiotics borrows what is best from teleosemantics to provide a content-free 
naturalistic account of the determinate intentional directedness that organisms exhibit 
towards aspects of their environments. Yet unlike teleosemantics, it does not seek to 
understand the most basic forms of directedness in semantic, contentful or 
representational terms. The it holds that the biologically basic modes of organismic 
responding are not to be understood as content-involving, where content is understood in 
terms of reference or truth conditions.  
 Modifying EAT in line with teleosemiotics confers another advantage, apart from 
dodging the stated worries about the workability of teleosemantics. Colombetti and 
Thompson (2008) complain of EAT that, despite promises, it does qualify as genuine 
embodied account of emotion because by its lights “the body still plays the role of an 
objective concomitant of emotion. It is the appraisal component that is seen to be in 
charge of providing personal significance” (Colombetti and Thompson 2008, p. 54-5). 
 Their chief objection is that EAT remains separatist: “it holds onto a disembodied 
conception of cognition (appraisal), and takes cognition so understood to be the source of 
the meaning of an emotion” (Colombetti and Thompson 2008, p. 55). Against this, they 
press for the more radical idea that:  
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cognition is a form of embodied action … the enactive approach implies that we need 
to move beyond the head/body and subjective/objective dichotomies that characterize 
much of emotion theory. Appraisal is not a cognitive process of subjective evaluation 
“in the head” and arousal and behavior are not objective bodily concomitants of 
emotion. Rather, bodily events are constitutive of appraisal, both structurally and 
phenomenologically (Colombetti and Thompson 2008, p. 56-8, emphases added). 
 
  Original variant EAT assumes that the representational vehicles of emotional content 
are wholly embrained. Presumably, it needn‟t. Yet, a modified EAT – one which swaps 
teleosemantics for teleosemiotics – takes things a step further. It denies that we should 
think of the bodily basis of emotional responses as content carrying vehicles at all. This 
is because it rejects the semantic model that seeks to understand basic intentionality in 
terms of contents. In doing so it also rejects all vestiges of the sentential model, upon 
which the vehicle/content distinction depends. As such, it places no a priori conditions 
on the location or extent of sort of organismic activity that constitutes any token 
emotional episode, apart from insisting that the dispositions that comprise token 
emotional experiences are dispositions of the organism. Hence, if we construe EAT as a 
response-based, as opposed to a standard representational, account of basic emotional 
engagements, it is wholly amenable to an enactivist (and, potentially, a fully embodied 
and not merely embrained) rendering. By its lights, there is surely no need to assume that 
emotional appraisals are solely „heady‟ affairs. 
 More importantly, as Colombetti and Thompson stress, enactivism offers a way to 
truly close the imagined gap between cognition proper, on the one hand, and mere bodily 
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and affective activity, on the other. This is achieved by adopting a quite liberal 
understanding of the nature of cognition. Thus Thompson proposes that “cognitive 
interactions are those in which sensory responses guide action and actions have 
consequences for subsequent sensory stimulation, subject to the constraint that the 
system maintain its viability. „Sensory response‟ and „action‟ are taken broadly to 
include, for example, a bacterium‟s ability to sense the concentration of sucrose in its 
immediate environment and to move itself accordingly” (Thompson 2007, p. 125). There 
seems no compelling reason to rule out such activity as an instance of cognition, albeit 
quite basic, other than antecedent attachment to the questionable cogntivist credo that all 
true cognition must involve the manipulation of contentful symbols. 
 With this in hand, let‟s consider Prinz‟s acknowledgement that in doing its 
emotionally work “the amygdala seems to be a body control centre, not an appraiser” 
(Prinz 2004, p. 38). Yet despite how things seem, EAT insists that the amygdala is an 
appraiser while also being a body control centre. It may be true that the amygdala is 
necessarily supported by a wider set of bodily systems in doing its work. But, under 
teleosemiotics, nothing precludes the wider set of bodily systems from playing both of 
these roles, simultaneously. If we accept all of this then it surely possible to close the gap 
between cognition and mere affect when it comes to thinking about the bodily basis of 
emotions. This follows if we accept Thompson‟s, quite liberal, criterion for being 
cognitive, rather than Prinz‟s pre-frontal criterion. If so, a modified EAT is surely 
compatible with the kind of enactivism that Thompson promotes, once we let go of 
Prinz‟s restrictive understanding of what counts as cognitive and EAT‟s commitment to 
semantic representationalism. 
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4. Residual Ratcliffian Worries 
 
A modified EAT does not escape Ratcliffe‟s (2008) „thermostat objection‟. He contends 
that a major problem with original variant EAT stems from its commitment to 
understanding emotions by offering account that would work just as well for 
understanding very simple modes of response. In his words: “Any account that applies 
equally to human cognition and to smoke alarms will not cast light on the nature of 
emotional experience or experience more generally” (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 29). 
 One fundamental problem, according to Ratcliffe, is EAT‟s endorsement of 
teleosemantics. For as he sees it, for those who accept teleosemanticsis “the criteria that 
something has to fulfil in order to be an intentional or „representational‟ state are so 
minimal that all sorts of unlikely candidates turn out to be intentional in character” 
(Ratcliffe 2008, p. 29).
v
 As noted, teleosemiotics rejects the counterintuitive idea that 
these very simple systems „represent‟ in offering its content-free account of 
intentionality. Moreover, simple mechanical artefacts – such as thermostats – do not 
qualify as even exhibiting basic mentality, if we go by Thompson‟s criteria, since they 
are not homeostatic, self-creating living systems. But Ratcliffe would regard these 
technical niceties as cold comfort. For, if anything, replacing teleosemantics with 
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teleosemiotics only apparently aggravates the gap between what is perceived to be 
properly human kinds of intentionality as opposed to much more basic ways of being 
„intentionally directed‟ at aspects of the world. 
 However, the correct response is to this worry is to note that what is on offer is a 
general schema for thinking about the nature of non-contentful modes of basic mentality 
– one that covers the responses of simpler organisms as well as some, but not all, 
distinctively human ways of responding. After all, teleosemiotics does not aspire to 
account for the intentionality of all modes of human responding (see the preamble).  
 Concomitantly, it is crucial to stress that the specifics matter – the devil is in the 
detail. Humans, simpler organisms and artefacts (such a thermostats) are neither set up to 
be set off by the same things, nor – crucially – do they respond in the same ways to the 
things that they are set off by. That we can, in principle, specify the targets and profiles of 
uniquely human patterns of response is enough to ensure that we don‟t confuse our basic 
ways of being intentionally directed with that of simpler creatures or artefacts. And it 
must be stressed that, unlike simple organisms and artefacts, in addition to our basic ways 
of engaging with the world and others we also have more sophisticated, content-based 
ways of doing so. 
 A different worry Ratcliffe (2008) raises is that EAT “completely dissociates the 
intentionality of emotion from the relevant phenomenology” (p. 29). And worse, “it has 
nothing at all to say about experience” (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 30). Presumably, the same 
same applies to a modified EAT. In light of the concerns that I have downplayed the 
importance of feelings in promoting radical enactivism to date (as mentioned in the 
preamble), it is worth saying a few words about these two concerns in closing. 
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 According to radical enactivism the phenomenal character of emotional responding is 
identical with, and to be understood in terms of, concrete patterns of environmental 
situated organismic activity, nothing more nor less. Phenomenally charged experiencing 
simply equates to the way in which certain creatures are disposed to respond to a range of 
worldly offerings. But understanding what it is that set up a creature to respond in these 
ways is a different matter. For this reason, even on the deflated, non-semantic 
understanding of intentional directedness offered by teleosemiotics, the intentional 
aspects of emotion do not reduce to its phenomenal aspects (nor vice versa). But it, as 
should be obvious, it does not follow that the intentional and phenomenal aspects are 
therefore „entirely dissociated‟.  
 Unless we conceive of feelings as something extra and logically distinct from 
organismic ways of responding, as is the wont of qualia-philes, then in providing its 
general framework, a modified EAT leaves it open that any particular emotional episode 
or engagement may have a distinctive phenomenal character. And it leaves it open how to 
best specify that character. For radical enactivists, the phenomenal character of an 
experience is identified with or determined by special objects of our mental acquaintance. 
Instead they are identified with specific, concrete activities of sentient beings – extended 
ways of responding, reacting, acting and interacting. To understand how things seem or 
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i
  The charge that I somehow neglect or underplay the fact that interpersonal 
relating has a crucial affective aspect is even more surprising, given that the 
author of the charge also recognizes that “For Hutto, the embodied forms of our 
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primary intersubjective engagement … are not based on „understanding‟, at least 
not in some principled or propositional sense” (Krueger 2010, p. 68). 
 
ii
  Accordingly, “our feeling of the [bodily] changes as they occur is the emotion” 
(James 1884, p. 190). 
 
iii
  Thus “One can find a common theme behind the range of things that elicit any 
given emotion … they are alike in one respect: they all involve … something 
valued” (Prinz 2004, p. 61). 
 
iv
  As Prinz acknowledges “This is just like somatic theories (James, Lange, 
Damasio) … with a new story about the semantic properties of the bodily 
perception” (Prinz 2004, p. 69).  
 
v
  As Ratcliffe observes “For example, it seems that pupil dilation is „about‟ 
decreased light intensity, as it reliably detects decreased light intensity and has an 
appropriate history” (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 29). Nevertheless, defender of 
teleosemantic accounts doe not think that any and all biological functionality 
entails intentionality, co-operating consumer responses of the right kind are also 
required. 
